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the contract contains a lien waiver provision would defeat the clear
purpose of the statute."' 59 It also advised that the filing of the lien as
a breach of the contract would be a matter for the arbitrator to consider.160
The possibility that one party will breach a contract condition is
often the very reason for including an arbitration provision. To allow
a breach to take the contract out of arbitration would negate the
parties' original intent.
REAL PROPERTY ACTIONS AND PROCEEDINGS LAW

RPAPL 735: Service on corporationby delivery of process to Secretary
of State, as its agent, supports judgment for rent and possession.
Rent arrears can be recovered in a summary possession proceeding
under article 7 of the Real Property Actions and Proceedings Law.
Under RPAPL 735, the court acquires in personam jurisdiction to
grant a money judgment if service of the notice and petition is made
by personal delivery to the respondent.1 61
In Leven v. Browne's Business School, Inc., 12 a landlord sought a
default judgment against a corporate tenant in a summary proceeding
for nonpayment of rent. The notice and petition were served by
delivery to the Secretary of State pursuant to BCL 306163 and in satisfaction of the requirements of CPLR 311 for personal service on a
corporation.0 4 While noting that, in the case of an individual, nothing
but delivery to the person himself will suffice,' 65 the Nassau County
District Court held that, in the case of a corporation, delivery to its
agent, including an agent appointed by law, is delivery to the
respondent-corporation, authorizing an in personam judgment on de159 40 App. Div. 2d at 97, 337 N.Y.S.2d at 959.
160 Id.
161 Originally RPAPL 735 provided that service "shall be made in the same manner
as personal service of a summons in an action." Thus, substituted service under the CPLR
dearly supported the in personam jurisdiction required for a money judgment in a
summary proceeding. See Callen v. De Koninck, 23 App. Div. 2d 757, 258 N.Y.S.2d 627 (2d
Dep't 1965) (mem.); Wayside Homes, Inc. v. Upton, 40 Misc. 2d 1087, 244 N.Y.S.2d 624
(Dist. Ct. Nassau County 1963), discussed in The Biannual Survey, 38 ST. JoHN's L. Rxv.

406, 453 (1964).

162 71 Misc. 2d 842, 337 N.Y.S.2d 307 (Dist. Ct. Nassau County 1972).
163 Under BCL 306, service of process on the Secretary of State as agent of a domestic
or authorized foreign corporation is complete upon delivering two copies of such process
to him in Albany. The Secretary of State is required to forward one copy by registered
mail to the corporation.
164CPLR 811(l) provides that personal service on a corporation shall be made by
delivering the summons to an officer, director, managing or general agent, cashier, assistant
cashier, or "any other agent authorized by appointment or by law to receive service."
165 71 Misc. 2d at 843, 339 N.Y.S.2d at 309. But see 1405 Realty Corp. v. Napier, 68
Misc. 2d 793, 828 N.Y.S.2d 44 (N.Y.C. Civ. Ct. Bronx County 1971), discussed in The Quarterly Survey, 47 ST. JOHN's L. Rv. 148, 184 (1972).
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SURVEY OF NEW YORK PRACTICE

fault1 6 The court concluded that problems as to the receipt of the
copy of the notice and petition which the Secretary of State is required
to mail the respondent do not affect the court's jurisdiction, but may
106
be grounds for opening a default judgment.
DAMAGES

Damages: Where survival and wrongful death actions are combined,
medical and funeral expenses are allocated to former when estate is
responsible and to latter when distributeesare responsible.
Where a decedent's personal injury action l 8 has been combined 1 9
7 ° and
with a wrongful death action, separate verdicts are required,1
medical and funeral expenses must be allocated to one of the causes
of action. These expenses are allocated to the survival cause and thus
to the decedent's estate when "paid by the estate or for the payment
of which the estate is responsible. .. ;"171 they are allocated to the
wrongful death action and thus to the decedent's distributees when
"paid by the distributees, or for the payment of which any distributee
is responsible... ."172 When such expenses have not been paid prior to
trial or settlement, the court must determine who is responsible for
payment.
The Surrogate's Court, Kings County, was faced with this problem
in In re Estate of Jackson 73 At the time of trial, medical and funeral
bills exceeding $5000 remained unpaid. After the jury awarded recovery in each cause, allocation was essential because a lien in excess
of the total assets of the estate existed.1 4 Correct procedure would be
for the personal representative to advise in his account to the court
166 71 Misc. 2d at 843-44, 337 N.Y.S.2d at 809.
167 Id. at 844, 337 N.Y.S.2d at 809. See Cascione v. Acme Equip. Corp., 23 App. Div.
2d 49, 258 N.Y.S.2d 234 (Ist Dep't 1965) (per curiam); Montulli v. Sherlo Realty, Inc., 37
Misc. 2d 655, 284 N.Y.S.2d 754 (Sup. Ct. Monroe County 1962), af'd mem., 18 App. Div. 2d
1139, 239 N.Y.S.2d 864 (4th Dep't 1963).
108EPTL 11-3.3(a) limits the damages recoverable in such an action to those accruing
before death plus reasonable funeral expenses in appropriate cases. N.Y. Esr., Powms g
TRuSrs LAw § 11-3.3(a) (McKinney 1967).
169 Id. § 11-3.3(b)(1). The decedent's estate gets the benefit of the wrongful death rule
which makes contributory negligence a defense to be pleaded and proved by the defendant.
Id. § 11-3.2(b).
170d. § 11-3.3(b)(1).
171 Id. § 11-3.3(a).
172 Id. § 5-4.8. See Murphy v. New York C. & H.R.R., 88 N.Y. 445 (1882); Loeb v. Sheldon Foster Supply Co., 243 App. Div. 740, 277 N.Y.S. 439 (2d Dep't 1935).
173 71 Misc. 2d 133, 335 N.Y.S.2d 587 (Sur. Ct. Kings County 1972).
174 There are two basic reasons for allocation. First, the decedents debts are payable
only out of estate funds. Second, even if there are no estate debts, "[t]he same persons do
not necessarily share in the survival (pain and suffering) recovery and the wrongful death
recovery... Even when the same persons do share in each recovery, they do not share in
the same proportion." Id. at 134-35, 835 N.Y.S.2d at 590.

